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Abstract
There is a discrepancy between CAPM-implied and realized returns. Using the CAPM
in capital budgeting – as recommended in finance textbooks – should thus have valu-
ation effects. For instance, low beta projects should be valued more by CAPM-using
managers than by the market. This paper empirically tests this hypothesis using pub-
licly announced M&A decisions and shows that takeovers of lower beta targets are
accompanied by lower cumulative abnormal returns for the bidders. Specifically, our
estimates imply an average net loss to bidders corresponding to 12% of the average deal
value and exceeding USD 10 billion per year in aggregate.
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1 Introduction
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966) is
the predominant model of risk and return taught by academics in universities and business schools
in undergraduate, MBA, and executive education programs. The CAPM is also widely used in
practice, in particular, to estimate firms’ cost of (equity) capital.1 However, it is well known that
the CAPM does not fit the data. The average realized returns of low beta securities are higher
and those of high beta securities lower than the CAPM predicts. In other words, the slope of
the empirical security market line (SML) is less steep than implied by the CAPM (e.g., Black,
Jensen, and Scholes, 1972; Fama and French, 2004; Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler, 2011; Frazzini
and Pedersen, 2014).
We show that the widespread use of the CAPM for cost of capital estimations despite the
divergence between CAPM-implied and realized returns has important implications for the market’s
reaction to firms’ capital budgeting decisions. The intuition is as follows. For low beta investments,
the cost of capital implied by the CAPM is lower than the cost of capital implied by the empirical
SML. Equivalently, the “CAPM-based valuation” of low beta investments exceeds their market
valuation. As a consequence, managers who rely on the CAPM for capital budgeting purposes are
willing to acquire low beta projects at prices that the market deems too high. The reverse holds
for high beta projects. It follows that the stock market reaction upon the announcement of low
beta investments is less favorable than upon the announcement of high beta investments.
1Among the CFOs of public firms surveyed in Graham and Harvey (2001, p. 201), “the CAPM is by far the
most popular method of estimating the cost of equity capital: 73.5% of respondents always or almost always use the
CAPM.” Jacobs and Shivdasani (2012, p. 120) report that “about 90% of the respondents in a survey conducted by
the Association for Financial Professionals use the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to estimate the cost of equity.”
In a survey among valuation professionals, Mukhlynina and Nyborg (2016, p. 22) find that “76% of respondents use
the CAPM almost always or always” to compute the cost of equity.
1
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To test this prediction, we focus on large-scale investments: mergers and acquisitions. Using
data from SDC Platinum for the period from 1977 to 2015, we show that takeover bids for low beta
targets entail more negative stock market reactions than bids for high beta targets. Specifically,
we find that a difference in target betas of one interquartile range is associated with a difference
in bidder cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 0.5 to 1.2 percentage points, corresponding to
6% to 16% of the interquartile range of bidder CARs. This relation is not explained by any of the
CAR determinants that have been documented in the existing literature and does not depend on
the model we use to estimate betas or CARs. We also do not find any evidence of return reversal in
the long run, suggesting long-lasting wealth effects for investors. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to document this relation between bidder CARs and target betas. In terms of dollar
values, our estimates imply that acquirers incur an average loss per deal of USD 37 million due to
their reliance on the CAPM. This loss corresponds to 12% of the average deal value and implies
aggregate losses in excess of USD 10 billion per year.
Potential concerns are that our estimates of target betas may only be noisy proxies for the
actual beta-estimates used by managers or that target betas may be correlated with unobserved
determinants of bidder CARs. For example, acquisitions of high beta targets may be associated
with larger synergies, or high beta targets may have lower bargaining power vis-a`-vis their acquirers.
We mitigate such concerns by estimating two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) regressions. To do so, we
rely on mutual fund fire sales as a source of non-fundamental variation in realized stock returns
(i.e., noise), which in turn translates into non-fundamental variation in beta-estimates (i.e., noise
in the coefficient estimates from a regression of excess stock on excess market returns). Using the
(scaled) in-sample covariance between the estimated noise components of realized excess returns
and excess market returns as an instrument for the beta-estimates corroborates our results: We
find a positive and statistically significant relation between bidder CARs and target betas with a
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magnitude that is similar to our OLS estimates. We also show that high beta targets have lower
bid-implied valuations, that betas do not predict future cash flows, and that there is no relation
between target betas and the combined CARs of bidders and targets. All of these findings are
at odds with the idea that acquisitions of high beta targets are associated with larger synergies.
Further, we show that the WACC used in fairness opinions on the takeover bids increases with the
targets’ beta, supporting the premise that the CAPM is used to estimate discount rates in practice.
We also test a number of cross-sectional predictions. The positive relation between a bidder’s
CAR and target’s beta is stronger if the target’s relative size vis-a`-vis the bidder and the target’s
growth rate are high. The intuition is that a larger size and higher growth rate amplify the difference
between the CAPM-implied value of the target and the market’s assessment of the target’s value.
We also find that the relation is stronger for bidders that are more likely to rely on the CAPM
(as proxied by their mentioning of the CAPM in SEC filings). Consistent with the intuition that
readily available market prices dampen the impact of using the CAPM for valuation purposes, we
find that the relation between a bidder’s CAR and target’s beta is stronger for private than for
public targets. Further, as bids below the current market price are unlikely to be accepted by the
target’s shareholders, we predict and find that the relation between a bidder’s CAR and target’s
beta vanishes for high beta public targets (but not for high beta private targets). These cross-
sectional patterns are important as they lend further support to the idea that the positive relation
between target betas and bidder CARs is indeed due to bidders’ reliance on the CAPM despite the
divergence between CAPM-implied and realized returns. Any alternative story must explain not
only this main finding but also all of the cross-sectional results.
Bidders’ reliance on the CAPM for valuation purposes also has implications for their choice
between stock and cash offers. If bidders rely on the CAPM to assess the true value of their own
equity, low (high) beta bidders will tend to perceive their own shares as undervalued (overvalued)
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by the market. We thus predict that low (high) beta bidders are less (more) likely to propose
payment in stock. We find that this is indeed the case.
Finally, we explore the implications of relying on the CAPM for capital structure decisions.
Similar to our prediction regarding the relation between a bidder’s beta and the propensity to offer
stock rather than cash when making a takeover bid, we predict that high beta firms are less likely
to repurchase shares but more likely to issue equity than low beta firms. The intuition is that
firms that believe to be overvalued by the market are more likely to issue equity and less likely to
repurchase shares (Baker and Wurgler, 2013; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Brav, Graham, Harvey,
and Michaely, 2005). Our analyses provide strong support for this prediction.
Our paper’s contribution is to show that the widespread use of the CAPM for capital budgeting
and valuation purposes in practice despite the well known divergence between CAPM-implied and
realized returns has real consequences. Firms that rely on the CAPM tend to overvalue low and
undervalue high beta investment projects – relative to the market’s assessment of the projects’
value. From the market’s point of view, these firms are thus prone to overpay for low beta projects
and to acquire high beta projects at a bargain. As a consequence, the market tends to react
negatively (positively) to the announcement of new low (high) beta projects. Moreover, firms’
reliance on the CAPM has implications for their capital structure decisions. Low beta firms are
more likely to perceive their own stock as undervalued by the market and are thus less likely to
issue equity and more likely to repurchase shares. The opposite holds for high beta firms.
Our work is related to recent literature on the real effects of the use or misuse of the CAPM
in corporate finance. Most related is Baker, Hoeyer, and Wurgler (2016), who start from the
same observation as we do: High beta stocks have low realized returns. As a result, CAPM-
using managers believe high beta equity to be overvalued by the market. Hence, high beta firms
tend to use more equity and less debt. Baker, Hoeyer, and Wurgler (2016) assume that CAPM-
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using managers are right and maximize shareholder value. But their theory is also consistent with
CAPM-using managers being wrong but believing they maximize shareholder value. In any case,
the discrepancy between CAPM-implied and realized returns has, in their paper, a real effect on
leverage. In our paper, we focus on the valuation effect of the discrepancy, though we confirm
their capital structure results in our analysis of stock issuances and repurchases (Section 4.7).
Jagannathan, Matsa, Meier, and Tarhan (2016) offer survey evidence that high beta firms use
higher discount rates than low beta firms, which supports the premise that firms use the CAPM to
compute discount rates. Our paper is further related to Kru¨ger, Landier, and Thesmar (2015), who
also assume that firms use the CAPM in valuation but tend to apply the beta of the firm’s core
division even to projects with a different risk level. Hence, while we expect high beta targets to be
undervalued, Kru¨ger, Landier, and Thesmar (2015) expect targets acquired by high beta bidders to
be undervalued. These are two different mechanisms, but to make sure our findings are not driven
by bidders using their own cost of capital to value targets, we check that our results are unchanged
when controlling for the bidder’s beta. Our paper is also related to Levi and Welch (2016), who
recommend that betas be computed with a double shrinkage. This would be consistent with an
interpretation of our results whereby managers overestimate the slope of the real SML. Finally,
our paper is related to van Binsbergen and Opp (2017)’s recent study on the quantitative impact
of real anomalies. They explore a wider set of anomalies than we do but perform a very different
exercise from ours: They make a model-based quantification of the real impact of anomalies, while
we attempt to trace out the impact of one anomaly on firm behavior in the data.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop our main predictions. In Section 3, we
describe the data, and in Section 4, we present the empirical results. We address potential alter-
native explanations in Section 5. We discuss possible interpretations of our finding (are managers
irrational or not?) and provide suggestive evidence in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7. The
5
appendix contains variable definitions, robustness tests, and extensions.
2 Predictions
To provide a framework for our analysis, we now introduce a simple model that formalizes our
arguments. We consider a public firm that offers to acquire a fraction pi ∈ [0, 1] of another firm’s
equity at a price Bt ≡ pi×Et, where Et is the value of the target’s equity as assessed by the bidder.2
We denote with EBiddert the market value of the bidder’s equity, with E˜t the value of the target’s
equity as assessed by the market, and with ρ the market’s assessment of the probability that the
bid will be accepted. The cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock in response to the bid
announcement is given by3
CARBiddert =
ρ× pi
EBiddert
×
(
E˜t − Et
)
. (1)
Going forward, we assume for simplicity that the target is unlevered and that its future expected
free cash flows (FCFt+1) grow at a constant rate g that is smaller than the cost of capital but larger
than the risk-free rate.4 The bidder computes the value of the target (including any potential
synergies) by discounting the expected free cash flows at the cost of capital implied by the CAPM,
rA = rf + βA × µ, (2)
where rf denotes the risk-free rate, βA the bidder’s estimate of the target’s asset beta, and µ the
market risk premium. Hence, the bidder’s assessment of the target’s value is
Et =
FCFt+1
rA − g =
FCFt+1
rf + βA × µ− g . (3)
2Assuming that the bidder offers Bt = pi × Et facilitates the analysis but is not crucial. Our predictions are
qualitatively unchanged for any Bt = Bt (pi,Et) with
∂Bt(pi,Et)
∂Et
> 0.
3We assume that any gains or losses in case the bid is accepted are absorbed by the bidder’s shareholders (rather
than its creditors) and that there is no effect on the market value of the bidder’s equity in case the bid is not accepted.
4We show in the appendix that considering a levered target does not (qualitatively) change our predictions.
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Note that the assumption that the bidder relies exclusively on a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis
to value the target is for ease of exposition only. Assuming that the bidder values the target also
based on multiples (that are independent of βA) does not qualitatively change our predictions as
long as the bidder places at least some weight on the DCF-implied value.
Unlike the bidder (who relies on the CAPM), the market values the target based on the cost of
capital r˜A that is implied by the empirical security market line (SML). For simplicity, we assume
that the empirical SML is flat and crosses the CAPM-implied SML at β = 1.5 As a consequence,
the market’s assessment of the target’s value is
E˜t =
FCFt+1
r˜A − g =
FCFt+1
rf + µ− g . (4)
The bidder’s cumulative abnormal return around the bid announcement can thus be written as
CARBiddert =
ρ× pi
EBiddert
×
(
FCFt+1
rf + µ− g −
FCFt+1
rf + βA × µ− g
)
=
R× ρ× µ× (βA − 1)
rf + µ− g , (5)
where R ≡ pi × Et/EBiddert denotes the relative size of the bid vis-a`-vis the market value of the
bidder’s equity. Taking the partial derivative with respect to the target’s asset beta, we obtain
∂CARBiddert
∂βA
=
ρ× pi
EBiddert
× µ× FCFt+1
(rf + βA × µ− g)2
=
R× ρ× µ
rf + βA × µ− g > 0, (6)
which motivates our main prediction:6
Prediction 1 The bidder’s cumulative abnormal return
(
CARBiddert
)
around the bid announcement
is increasing in the target’s asset beta (βA).
5We analyze the case of an empirical SML that is merely less steep than the CAPM-implied SML in the appendix.
6When deriving equation (6), we implicitly assume ∂ρ/∂βA = 0. This can be motivated as follows. Suppose
ρ = ρ (δ) +  with δ ≡ Bt − pi × E′t. E′t denotes the target’s value as assessed by its owners, and  is a random
term that is independent of everything else. That is, suppose the probability that the bid is accepted depends on the
perceived attractiveness of the bid (δ) and some random component (). If the target’s owners rely on the CAPM
(just like the bidder does), we have E′t = Et, δ = 0, and thus ∂ρ/∂βA = 0. Consistent with this argument, unreported
empirical tests based on our sample of takeover bids fail to reject the null-hypothesis that ∂ρ/∂βA = 0.
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Differentiating equation (6) with respect to the relative size of the bid (R) and the growth rate
of the target’s expected free cash flows (g) yields
∂2CARBiddert
∂βA∂R
=
ρ× µ
rf + µ− g > 0 (7)
and
∂2CARBiddert
∂βA∂g
=
ρ× pi
EBiddert
× 2× µ× FCFt+1
(rf + βA × µ− g)3
> 0, (8)
which leads to the following cross-sectional predictions:
Prediction 2 The positive relation between the bidder’s cumulative abnormal return
(
CARBiddert
)
around the bid announcement and the target’s asset beta (βA) is stronger if
a) the relative size of the bid (R) is larger.
b) the growth rate of the target’s expected free cash flows (g) is larger.
3 Data
Data on takeover bids come from Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum M&A database. We use
all observations between 1977 and 2015 with a public bidder and a deal value of at least USD 50
million (inflation adjusted to December 2015 terms). Table 1 presents descriptive statistics.7 We
distinguish between bids for private targets (Panel A) and bids for public targets (Panel B).
[Table 1 around here.]
The average cumulative abnormal return of the bidders’ stock around the bid announcements
(from t = −3 to t = +3 for a bid announced on date t = 0) is positive for private targets (2.0%) and
negative for public targets (-0.6%), consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Betton, Eckbo, and
7All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Definitions are provided in the appendix.
8
Thorburn, 2008; Schneider and Spalt, 2017). The average deal value is USD 388 million (inflation-
adjusted) for private and USD 1,258 million for public targets. Bidders offer an all-stock payment
in 13% (33%) of the cases if the target is private (public). The average WACC used to provide
fairness opinions on the proposed deals is 14.1% for private and 13.1% for public targets.
The private (public) targets in our sample have an average asset beta of 0.86 (0.82) with a
standard deviation of 0.33 (0.36). The distribution of asset betas for the bidders is very similar.
All betas are computed as follows: First, for each public firm i in CRSP and at the end of each
month t, we regress monthly excess stock returns (RET in CRSP minus the risk-free rate from
Kenneth French’s webpage8) during the previous five years – i.e., from month t − 60 to month t
– on the corresponding excess returns of the CRSP value-weighted portfolio (including dividends).
The regression coefficient is the CAPM (equity-)beta βEit .
9 To ensure reasonable precision, we
drop estimates based on less than 36 months of return data. Further, we drop observations for
which the estimated beta is negative, and we drop the same number of observations in the right
tail of the distribution of estimated betas. Second, we delever each beta using the formula βAit =
βEit / [1 + (1− τ)×Dit/Eit], where τ is the statutory tax rate in the highest bracket, Dit is total
debt at the end of the most recently completed fiscal year (DLT + DLC in Compustat), and Eit
is the market capitalization of firm i at the end of month t. Using alternative methodologies to
delever the equity betas does not materially affect the results. Third, we compute the equally
weighted average of βAit of all public firms in CRSP with the same three-digit primary SIC code.
Finally, we attribute to the target and the bidder the equally weighted average asset beta of their
respective industries as of the last completed month before the bid announcement. Hence, if the
bidder and the target operate in the same industry, they have the same asset beta.
8http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html
9We use sharecodes 10 and 11 and compute the value-weighted average beta in case of multiple securities per firm.
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It is important to note that to test our predictions, we require an estimate of the beta that was
used by the bidder when valuing the target. That is, our goal is not to estimate a target’s “true”
CAPM-beta but to replicate as closely as possible the estimation procedure most likely used by a
bidder in our sample. For that reason, we follow common industry practice and rely on five years
of monthly returns, use the standard (textbook) formula to delever equity betas, and compute the
equally weighted average asset beta of the target’s public peers. Our results, however, are not
materially affected when using alternative methodologies to estimate, delever, or aggregate betas.
4 Results
4.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Bidders’ Stock
We now test our main prediction: The bidder’s cumulative abnormal return around the bid an-
nouncement is increasing in the target’s asset beta (Prediction 1). For the purpose of this analysis,
we focus on takeover bids for private targets. The reason is that we expect the relation between a
bidder’s CAR and target’s asset beta to be weaker for public targets. The intuition is as follows.
For public targets, the market’s valuation is observable in form of the targets’ market capital-
ization. This has two consequences. First, we expect the observable market valuation to act as a
counterweight to the bidders’ own assessment of the targets’ value: Bidders are likely to adjust their
own valuations downward (upward) if they exceed (fall short of) the market’s valuation. Second,
bidders are unlikely to successfully acquire public targets at prices below their current market cap-
italizations because the targets’ shareholders are unlikely to accept such offers. As a consequence,
we do not expect to find a relation between bidders’ announcement CARs and targets’ asset betas
for high beta public targets (whose market value is likely to exceed the CAPM-implied value). For
this reason, we restrict attention to private targets. We test our model’s differential predictions
10
regarding private and public targets in section 4.5.
We estimate the following OLS regression:
Bidder CAR = α+ β × Target Asset Beta + γ × Beta Spread
α+ δ′Deal Controls + η′Target Controls + κ′Bidder Controls
α+ Bidder Industry × Year Fixed Effects + ε. (9)
Bidder CAR is the bidder’s cumulative abnormal return during the seven days around the bid
announcement (i.e., from date t−3 to date t+3 for a bid announced on date t = 0).10 Target Asset
Beta is the target’s asset beta. Beta Spread is the difference between the target’s and bidder’s asset
beta. We include this variable to control for the effect of bidders using their own beta – rather
than the target’s beta – to compute the cost of capital (Kru¨ger, Landier, and Thesmar, 2015). Deal
Controls are characteristics that are commonly used as control variables in the M&A literature.11
Target Controls are the target’s market-to-book ratio, return on assets, and leverage, as well as
cash holdings and cash flow (both scaled by assets).12 Bidder Controls are defined analogously.
The standard errors are clustered by target industry.13
[Table 2 around here.]
Table 2 presents the results. In column (1), we do not include any control variables other than
10Our findings are robust to using alternative event windows, e.g., from t− 2 to t+ 2 or from t− 1 to t+ 1.
11See, e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), Golubov, Petmezas, and
Travlos (2012), Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2012), and Dessaint, Golubov, and Volpin (2017). Specifi-
cally, we control for Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender,
Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). Detailed definitions are provided in the appendix.
12For private firms, we use the equally weighted average of these variables computed across all public firms that
operate in the same industry (based on the first three digits of the firms’ primary SIC code).
13Our findings are unchanged if we use block bootstrap standard errors instead.
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the fixed effects. We add the deal controls in column (2), the target controls in column (3), and the
bidder controls in column (4). In column (5), we also add Beta Spread, the difference between the
target’s and the bidder’s asset beta. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates
and associated t-statistics for the target and bidder controls.
In all five columns, we find positive coefficient estimates on Target Asset Beta that are statis-
tically significant at the 1% level.14 The point estimates range from 1.02 in column (1) to 2.55 in
column (5) and imply that an increase in Target Asset Beta by one interquartile range (0.49) is
associated with an increase in Bidder CAR by 0.5 to 1.2 percentage points, corresponding to 6%
to 16% of Bidder CAR’s interquartile range (7.9%).
4.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation
Potential concerns are that the variable Target Asset Beta may only be a noisy proxy for the actual
beta-estimate used by managers or that Target Asset Beta may be correlated with unobserved
determinants of bidder CARs (e.g., synergies or bargaining power). In the former case, our estimates
would suffer from an attenuation bias and underestimate the true relation between bidder CARs
and target betas (as estimated by the bidders). In the latter case, our estimates could be either
upward- or downward-biased, depending on the signs of the correlations between the unobserved
determinants, Target Asset Beta, and bidder CARs.
To address such concerns, we construct an instrument for Target Asset Beta and estimate the
effect on bidder CARs in a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) framework. To do so, we rely on mutual
fund fire sales as a source of non-fundamental variation in realized stock returns (i.e., noise), which
in turn translates into non-fundamental variation in beta-estimates (i.e., noise in the coefficient
14Table A.1 in the appendix shows that this finding does not depend on the model used to estimate Bidder CAR.
Table A.2 shows that the results are similar when we use the target’s equity beta instead of its asset beta.
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estimates from a regression of excess stock on excess market returns). The intuition is as follows.
In practice, a given firm’s equity-beta is typically estimated by regressing realized stock returns
in excess of a proxy for the risk free rate on realized excess returns of a market proxy. The beta-
estimate is then defined as
β̂ ≡ σ̂r,m
σ̂2m
, (10)
where σ̂r,m denotes the in-sample covariance between the excess stock return r and the excess
market return rm, and σ̂
2
m denotes the in-sample variance of rm.
15
The realized excess stock return can be written without loss of generality as the sum of a
fundamental and a noise component,
r = r∗ + u, (11)
where r∗ denotes the fundamental component, and the noise component is defined as u ≡ r− r∗. It
follows that the beta-estimate (β̂) can be decomposed into a “fundamental beta” (β̂∗) and a “noise
beta” (β̂u), i.e.,
β̂ =
σ̂r,m
σ̂2m
=
σ̂r∗,m
σ̂2m
+
σ̂u,m
σ̂2m
= β̂∗ + β̂u, (12)
where σ̂r∗,m and σ̂u,m are the in-sample covariances between r
∗ and rm and u and rm, respectively.
This decomposition suggests that the (scaled) in-sample covariance between non-fundamental shocks
to a firm’s realized excess stock returns and the excess returns on the market proxy can be used as
an instrument for the beta-estimate, i.e., β̂u can be used to instrument β̂.
To implement this strategy, we rely on mutual fund fire sales as a source of non-fundamental
variation in firms’ realized stock returns. Coval and Stafford (2007) show that stock sales by mu-
tual funds that experience large outflows create large, negative demand shocks for the liquidated
15Some data providers (e.g., Bloomberg) also offer “adjusted beta” estimates that are a weighted average between
the “raw beta” estimate and one (e.g., β̂adj. =
2
3
×β̂+ 1
3
). We abstract away from such adjustments as they complicate
the exposition but do not change the intuition behind our identification strategy.
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stocks and thus have a negative impact on realized returns. Fund managers, however, can exercise
discretion when deciding which of their positions to liquidate. To mitigate the concern that fund
managers’ choices which shares to sell introduce a correlation between stock sales and firm fun-
damentals, we follow Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) and rely on hypothetical rather than
actual sales. In particular, for each stock, we compute the total dollar amount of hypothetical
mutual fund fire sales scaled by the total dollar amount of trading in the stock (HMFFS), assuming
that each position in an affected fund’s portfolio is liquidated in proportion to its portfolio weight,
so that the overall composition of the portfolio remains unchanged.16 This approach ensures that
the variable HMFFS is not affected by fund managers’ discretion regarding which stocks to sell
after a large outflow.
Next, we use HMFFS to estimate the non-fundamental noise component in firms’ stock returns.
Specifically, for each public firm in the CRSP database and for each beta-estimation period in our
sample, we regress the firm’s realized excess stock return r on HMFFS,
r = α+ γ ×HMFFS + ε, (13)
and use the fitted value from this regression – the predicted excess return due to mutual fund fire
sales – as an estimate of the non-fundamental noise component (û) in the realized excess return.17
We then define
β̂û ≡
σ̂û,m
σ̂2m
, (14)
where σ̂û,m is the in-sample covariance between the estimated noise component and the realized
excess return of the market proxy. Finally, in analogy to the construction of Target Asset Beta, we
16We provide a detailed description of the construction of HMFFS in the appendix.
17Note that our approach does not require that HMFFS explains the entire noise term u in r = r∗+u. In particular,
assume that u is the sum of unexplained noise η and noise ν that is due to mutual fund fire sales, i.e., r = r∗+ η+ ν.
In that case, we have β̂ = β̂∗ + β̂η + β̂ν , and β̂ν can be used to instrument β̂.
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delever the firm-level estimates of β̂u and compute the equally-weighted average at the industry
level. The resulting variable – denoted Target Noise Beta – is our instrument for Target Asset Beta.18
To be a valid instrument, Target Noise Beta must satisfy two conditions. First, it must be
correlated with Target Asset Beta. This condition can be tested using the first-stage of the 2SLS
procedure: The results show that the correlation between Target Noise Beta and Target Asset Beta
is positive and highly statistically significant (Table 3, Panel A). With t-statistics above ten, the
implied F -statistics are an order of magnitude larger than the threshold suggested by Stock, Wright,
and Yogo (2002) to guard against weak instruments. To mitigate concerns about the robustness of
this finding, we explore the correlation between the two variables in further detail. Figure A.1 (in
the appendix) shows the estimated coefficients from a regression of Target Asset Beta on indicator
variables for different ranges of Target Noise Beta. This analysis reveals a strong and monotone re-
lation that corroborates the positive correlation between Target Asset Beta and Target Noise Beta
that we find in Table 3, Panel A.
The second condition that Target Noise Beta must satisfy to be a valid instrument is that it must
be uncorrelated with the error term in the regression of Bidder CAR on Target Asset Beta. This
condition cannot be tested. Note, however, that β̂û is the (scaled) in-sample covariance between
the estimated noise component in realized excess stock returns and realized excess returns on the
market proxy. This implies that Target Noise Beta is as good as randomly assigned as long as the
estimated effect of mutual fund fire sales on excess stock returns indeed represents non-fundamental
noise. The evidence documented in a growing number of papers is consistent with this premise:
18To ensure that Target Noise Beta and Target Asset Beta are constructed based on the same sample of observa-
tions, we exclude β̂u-estimates if the corresponding β̂-estimates are missing. Further, we set Target Noise Beta to
missing if the average estimated effect of HMFFS on r at the industry level is in the top or bottom percentile of the
sample distribution. This procedure mitigates the concern that Target Noise Beta may be driven by outliers in the
distribution of estimated noise components.
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Mutual fund fire sales trigger a drop in stock prices that is followed by subsequent reversal, and
corporate insiders trade against these shocks.19 Both findings are consistent with the notion that
mutual fund fire sales represent temporary, non-fundamental demand shocks that induce noise in
firms’ stock returns.20
Finally, it is unclear why the in-sample covariance between non-fundamental noise in the return
realizations and the excess market return during the beta-estimation period (i.e., during the five
years before the deal announcement) would affect the bidder CAR in a subsequent acquisition
through any channel other than the effect on the beta estimate. Taken together, plausibly random
assignment of β̂û and a single channel – the effect on β̂ – through which β̂û affects bidder CARs
suggest that Target Noise Beta is uncorrelated with the error term in the regression of Bidder CAR
on Target Asset Beta and thus satisfies the exclusion restriction.
Table 3 displays the results of the 2SLS estimation.21 In Panel A, columns (1) to (4), we
present the results of the first-stage regressions of Target Asset Beta on Target Noise Beta. In
columns (5.a) and (5.b), we instrument Target Asset Beta and Beta Spread with Target Noise Beta
and Bidder Noise Beta.22 The coefficient estimates on Target Noise Beta in all columns are positive
and strongly significant. Similarly, the coefficient on Bidder Noise Beta in column (5.b) is negative
and strongly significant.
In Panel B, we report the results of the second-stage regressions. The coefficient estimates on
19See, e.g., Ali, Wei, and Zhou (2011), Goldman (2017), Honkanen and Schmidt (2017), and Dessaint, Foucault,
Fre´sard, and Matray (2018).
20Other papers that exploit mutual fund fire sales as a source of non-fundamental shocks to stock prices/returns
include Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), Phillips and Zhdanov (2013), Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito, and Perez
(2014), and Eckbo, Makaew, and Thorburn (2017).
21The sample period for this analysis is 1980 to 2015 as data on mutual funds flows is not available prior to 1980.
22We construct Bidder Noise Beta in analogy to Target Noise Beta.
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Target Asset Beta are positive and statistically significant in all five columns – at the 5% level in
columns (1) to (3) and at the 10% level in columns (4) and (5). Further, the IV coefficient estimates
are similar in magnitude to the OLS estimates presented in Table 2. These results corroborate our
earlier findings of a positive relation between Target Asset Beta and Bidder CAR.
4.3 Cross-Sectional Variation
We now test Predictions 2 a) and b) regarding cross-sectional variation of the relation between a
bidder’s CAR and target’s asset beta. To do so, we define two indicators: High Growth is equal to
one if the growth rate of aggregate sales in the target’s industry over the past three years is larger
than the sample median. High Relative Size is equal to one if the relative size of the takeover bid
vis-a`-vis the market value of the bidder’s equity is larger than the sample median.
In addition, we also define the indicator CAPM Usage, which is equal to one if the words
“CAPM” or “Capital Asset Pricing Model” occur in the bidder’s 10K, 10Q, and 8K filings during
the three years prior to the bid announcement. The idea is that the relation between a bidder’s
CAR and target’s asset beta stems from the bidder’s reliance on the CAPM. Hence, we expect a
stronger effect for bidders that are more likely to use the CAPM and attempt to proxy for this
likelihood with the indicator CAPM Usage.
We estimate OLS regressions in which we interact Target Asset Beta with the indicators just
described.23 Table 4 presents the results. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient
estimates and corresponding t-statistics for the control variables.
[Table 4 around here.]
As predicted by our model, we find that the relation between a bidder’s cumulative abnormal
23We also interact all control variables and fixed effects with these indicators, thus allowing their coefficients to
depend on the values of High Growth, High Relative Size, and CAPM Usage, respectively.
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return around the bid announcement and the target’s asset beta is stronger if the growth in the
target’s industry is high and if the relative size of the bid is high. Further, the relation is stronger
if the bidder is more likely to rely on the CAPM (as proxied by the indicator CAPM Usage).
4.4 Model Calibration and Implied Losses to Bidders
To assess how well our model explains the relation between Bidder CAR and Target Asset Beta, we
calibrate the model to the data. For the purpose of this calibration, we allow for different degrees
of steepness of the empirical SML. Specifically, we assume that the empirical SML has a slope of
γ × µ for some γ ∈ [0, 1], so that the cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock in response
to the bid announcement is given by24
CARBiddert = ρ×
pi × FCFt+1
EBiddert
×
[
1
rf + (γ × βA + 1− γ)× µ− g −
1
rf + βA × µ− g
]
. (15)
The average bid for private targets has a value of USD 314 million, and the average market
value of the bidder’s equity is USD 10,269 million. The average probability that a bid is accepted is
92%.25 We use the average yield on 20-year U.S. treasury bonds during the sample period (5.0%)
to proxy for the risk-free rate, the average nominal GDP growth (5.4%) to proxy for the growth
rate of the target’s expected free cash flows, and we assume a market risk premium of 6%. Using
these values, we compute the model-implied bidder CAR given by equation (15) for different values
of the target’s asset beta and different degrees of steepness of the empirical SML.26
[Figure 1 around here.]
24See the appendix for the derivation. A flat empirical SML corresponds to γ = 0, and an empirical SML that
coincides with the CAPM-implied SML corresponds to γ = 1.
25These statistics are based on the sample of 12,109 observations used to estimate column (5) in Table 2.
26We hold
pi×FCFt+1
EBiddert
= Bt×(rA−g)
EBiddert
constant at 314×(0.05+0.9×0.06−0.054)
10,269
= 0.153%, based on our assumptions about
the model parameters and an average target asset beta of 0.9 in the sample used to estimate column (5) of Table 2.
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Figure 1 presents the results. The dashed blue line shows the model-implied bidder CAR for
an empirical SML that is entirely flat (γ = 0) and the dashed gray line for an empirical SML that
coincides with the SML implied by the CAPM (γ = 1). The solid blue line corresponds to the case
of an empirical SML that is half as steep as the CAPM-implied SML (γ = 0.5). The solid red line
shows the OLS coefficient estimates of indicator variables for different ranges of asset betas (using
the same controls as in column (5) of Table 2).27 Overall, except for very low asset betas, the model
captures the empirical relation between Bidder CAR and Target Asset Beta reasonably well.
The calibration of our model also allows us to assess the implied dollar value of the losses
incurred by the bidders that are due to their reliance on the CAPM. The idea is that we observe
the bidders’ actual bids and can use the calibrated model to back-out the counterfactual bids that
would have been made had the bidders relied on the empirical SML when valuing the targets. We
then estimate the implied loss to the bidders (∆) as the difference between the actual bids (Bt)
and the counterfactual bids (B˜t). Specifically, for each completed takeover, we compute
28
∆ ≡ Bt − B˜t = Bt × r˜A − rA
r˜A − g = Bt ×
µ× (1− βA)× (1− γ)
rf + (γ × βA + 1− γ)× µ− g , (16)
using the actual bid Bt that we observe in the data, our estimate of βA for the target, γ = 0.5,
rf = 5%, µ = 6%, and g = 5.4%.
Based on this computation, we estimate a mean (median) implied loss of USD 37 million (USD
7 million) per completed deal, corresponding to 12% (6%) of the mean (median) deal value of USD
299 million (USD 111 million) for completed takeovers of private targets. To put these numbers in
perspective, note that the mean (median) offer premium in control contests for public U.S. targets
reported in Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) is 48% (39%). Assuming implied offer premiums
of a similar magnitude for private targets, our estimates imply that the loss per deal due to relying
27The corresponding coefficient estimates are reported in Table A.3 in the appendix.
28Note that our model implies Bt = pi × FCFt+1rA−g and B˜t = pi ×
FCFt+1
r˜A−g .
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on the CAPM corresponds to 25% (15%) of the mean (median) offer premium. Aggregating across
all completed takeovers of private targets in our sample, our estimates imply a total loss of USD
427 billion incurred by the bidders between 1977 to 2015, thus exceeding USD 10 billion per year.
Our model implies that all losses incurred by the bidders are gains that accrue to the targets
(and vice versa). Hence, an alternative perspective is to compute the absolute value of the difference
between each actual and counterfactual bid (|∆|). Doing so allows us to gauge the magnitude of
the wealth transfers between the bidders’ and targets’ shareholders – and thus the misallocation of
capital – that is due to their reliance on the CAPM. The mean (median) value of |∆| for completed
takeovers of private targets in our sample is USD 58 million (USD 16 million), corresponding to
19% (14%) of the mean (median) deal value. Aggregating across all completed deals implies a total
misallocation of capital of USD 723 billion, i.e., more than USD 18 billion per year.
4.5 Private vs. Public Targets
So far, we have focused on bids for private targets. We now consider both private and public targets
and examine whether and how the relation between a bidder’s cumulative abnormal return around
the bid announcement and the target’s asset beta varies between the two types of targets.
An important difference between public and private targets is that an observable market val-
uation is available for the former but not the latter. This matters because a bidder is unlikely to
make a (successful) takeover bid for a public target at a price that is lower than the target’s current
market value. In the terminology of our model: A bidder is unlikely to successfully acquire a public
target at price Et if its market price is E˜t > Et because the target’s shareholders are unlikely to
accept such offer. Moreover, even if E˜t < Et, we expect the relation between a bidder’s CAR and
public target’s asset beta to be weaker than for a private target because the bidder is likely to
revise its valuation in the direction of the (publicly observable) market capitalization of the target.
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As a consequence, for public targets, we expect a positive (albeit weaker) relation between the
bidder’s CAR and target’s asset beta if the beta is low and no relation if it is high. The reason
is that for a public target with a low asset beta, the bidder is likely to use a discount rate that is
lower than the discount rate used by the market (i.e., rA < r˜A), so that the bidder’s valuation is
likely to exceed the market valuation (i.e., Et > E˜t). For a public target with a high asset beta,
instead, the market valuation is likely to exceed the bidder’s valuation (i.e., E˜t > Et). In that case,
we expect the bidder to make a bid at (or above) the current market price or to not bid at all.
The situation is different for a private target: E˜t is neither observable to the bidder nor to the
target’s shareholders. Hence, we expect a positive relation between a bidder’s CAR and target’s
asset beta both for low and for high beta private targets (as predicted by our model).
[Table 5 around here.]
Table 5 presents regression results for two sub-samples: bids for private targets in columns
(1) to (3) and bids for public targets in columns (4) to (6). To conserve space, we do not report
the coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics for the control variables. Columns (1) and
(4) correspond to equation (9) and the results reported in column (5) of Table 2. We find a
statistically significant relation between the bidder’s CAR and target’s asset beta for the sample of
private targets in column (1) but not for the sample of public targets in column (4).
Columns (2) and (5) show the coefficient estimates for variables indicating whether a target’s
asset beta falls within the bottom or top quartile of the distribution of asset betas in the sam-
ple, 1 {Target Asset Beta in Bottom Quartile} and 1 {Target Asset Beta in Top Quartile}, respec-
tively. The results indicate that bids for targets with asset betas in the bottom quartile of the beta
distribution are associated with lower bidder CARs (relative to bids for targets with asset betas
in the middle of the distribution) in both samples. Bids for targets with asset betas in the top
quartile of the distribution, however, are associated with higher bidder CARs only in the sample
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of private but not in the sample of public targets. The null-hypothesis that the coefficients on
1 {Target Asset Beta in Top Quartile} in columns (2) and (5) are the same is rejected by a Wald
test at the 10% level and at the 5% level by a Fisher non-parametric permutation test based on
5,000 simulations (see, e.g., Cleary, 1999).
These findings are mirrored by the results shown in columns (3) and (6). In these specifications,
we estimate piecewise linear regressions that allow the marginal effect of Target Asset Beta to differ
between low beta (βA < 0.7) and high beta (βA > 0.7) targets. For private targets, in column (3),
we find positive and statistically significant coefficients for both low and high asset betas. For public
targets, in column (6), the coefficient is positive and statistically significant only for low but not
for high asset betas. The null-hypothesis that the coefficients on max {Target Asset Beta− 0.7, 0}
in columns (3) and (6) are the same is rejected by a Wald test at the 5% level and at the 1% level
by a Fisher non-parametric permutation test based on 5,000 simulations.
[Figure 2 around here.]
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of these findings.29 For the sample of private
targets on the left, we find a positive relation between Target Asset Beta and Bidder CAR over
the entire range of asset betas. In contrast, for public targets on the right, we find a significant
relation only for low beta targets. For high beta public targets, the relation between Target Asset
Beta and Bidder CAR is much flatter and not statistically significant.
4.6 Method of Payment
We now examine the relation between a bidder’s asset beta and the method of payment proposed
for takeover bids. Bidders who believe their own stock to be overvalued by the market are more
likely to propose paying in stock than in cash (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Hence, if bidders rely
29The corresponding coefficient estimates are reported in Table A.4 in the appendix.
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on the CAPM when assessing the value of their own equity, high beta bidders will be more likely
than low beta bidders to propose stock as the method of payment.30 To test this prediction, we
estimate the following OLS regression:
100% Stock = α+ β × Bidder Asset Beta + γ × Target Asset Beta
α+ δ′Deal Controls + η′Target Controls + κ′Bidder Controls
α+ Target Industry × Year Fixed Effects + ε. (17)
100% Stock is an indicator equal to one if the bidder proposes to pay entirely with stock.31
Bidder (Target) Asset Beta are the bidder’s and target’s asset beta, respectively. All other variables
are defined as in equation (9). The standard errors are clustered by bidder industry.
[Table 6 around here.]
Table 6 presents the results. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates and
corresponding t-statistics for the bidder and target controls. We find positive coefficient estimates
on Bidder Asset Beta that are highly statistically significant in all five columns. This finding
supports the prediction that high beta bidders are more likely to offer stock based payment.
4.7 Share Repurchases and Seasoned Equity Offerings
Our results on the method of payment extend beyond takeover bids. We have shown that high beta
bidders are more likely to use equity to pay for the target, but if our framework is correct, then the
propensity to issue equity should be higher for high beta firms whether they make acquisitions or
30An implicit assumption is that bidders do not perceive cash as being equally misvalued as equity.
31Table A.5 in the appendix shows that our findings are robust to the use of alternative variables aimed at capturing
bidders’ propensity to pay with stock rather than cash. Table A.6 shows that using the bidder’s and target’s equity
betas rather than their asset betas does not change the results.
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not. To a CAPM-using manager of a high beta firm, raising funds by issuing equity at the market
price looks like a positive-NPV transaction – irrespective of the planned use of these funds (M&A,
capital expenditures, other investments, capital structure changes, or even payouts). Repurchasing
shares at the market price, on the other hand, looks like a negative-NPV investment.
Thus, we now move away from the setting of takeover bids and examine the relation between
firms’ asset betas and their propensity to repurchase shares or conduct seasoned equity offerings.
The intuition is as follows. Firms that believe to be overvalued by the market are more likely to
issue equity and less likely to repurchase shares (Baker and Wurgler, 2013). Indeed, two-thirds of
CFOs state that “the amount by which our stock is undervalued or overvalued by the market” is
an important or very important determinant of the decision to issue equity (Graham and Harvey,
2001, p. 2016). More than 85% of financial executives state that the “market price of our stock
(if our stock is a good investment, relative to its true value)” is an important or very important
determinant of the decision to repurchase shares (Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, 2005, p.
496). Hence, we predict a negative relation between a firm’s asset beta and Repurchase – an
indicator equal to one if a firm repurchases shares – and a positive relation between a firm’s asset
beta and SEO – an indicator equal to one if a firm conducts a seasoned equity offering.
To test this prediction, we estimate the following OLS regression for all public firms in Compu-
stat between 1977 and 2015:32
Repurchaset (SEOt) = α+ β ×Asset Betat−1 + γ′Firm Characteristicst−1
α+ Industry × Year Fixed Effects + ε. (18)
Firm Characteristics is a vector of control variables commonly used in the literature on firms’
share repurchase or equity issuance decisions (e.g., Dittmar, 2000; Alti and Sulaeman, 2012; Baker
32Descriptive statistics for this sample are presented in Table A.7 in the appendix.
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and Xuan, 2016): the natural logarithm of total assets, the firm’s market-to-book ratio, and the
ratios of cash holdings, debt, and cash flows to assets. The standard errors are clustered by industry.
[Table 7 around here.]
Table 7 presents the results. As predicted, we find a negative and highly significant relation
between Asset Beta and Repurchase and a positive and highly significant relation between Asset
Beta and SEO.33
5 Alternative Explanations
5.1 Do Managers Use the CAPM?
Our prediction of a positive relation between the cumulative abnormal return of a bidder’s stock
around a bid announcement and the target’s asset beta is based on the premise that managers rely
on the CAPM when estimating the discount rate used to value the target. Surveys among corporate
executives and valuation professionals support this assumption: The vast majority of respondents
state that they always or almost always use the CAPM when estimating the cost of equity capital
(Graham and Harvey, 2001; Jacobs and Shivdasani, 2012; Mukhlynina and Nyborg, 2016).
To provide further support, we test the basic implication that the discount rate used in the
valuation is positively related to the target’s asset beta.34 For this purpose, we obtain data on
the discount rate (WACC ) used by investment bankers when providing fairness opinions. SDC
Platinum provides this information for 1,174 bids in our sample. We then estimate by OLS:
WACC = α+ β × Target Asset Beta + γ × Beta Spread
α+ δ ×Deal Value (Log) + η × Public Target + Year Fixed Effects + ε. (19)
33Table A.8 in the appendix shows that the results are similar when we use firms’ equity rather than asset beta.
34Specifically, our framework implies ∂rA/∂βA = µ > 0.
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Target Asset Beta is the target’s asset beta, and Beta Spread is the difference between the
target’s and bidder’s asset beta, as before. Deal Value (Log) is the natural logarithm of the value
of the takeover bid in USD million. Public Target is an indicator for targets that are listed. We
include these variables as bankers may adjust the WACC upwards for small and private targets
due to their lower liquidity. The standard errors are clustered by target industry.
[Table 8 around here.]
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results. In column (1), we only control for year fixed effects. In
column (2), we add Deal Value (Log) and Public Target, and in column (3), we add Beta Spread.
The coefficient estimate on Target Beta is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in
all three columns. This finding supports the premise that managers rely on the CAPM when
estimating the discount rate used to value the target. Note that the magnitude of the coefficient
estimate – ranging from 3% in column (1) to 4% in column (3) – is likely to be a lower bound for
the market risk premium used in the fairness opinions. One reason is that Target Asset Beta is
an estimate of the beta that was actually used to compute the WACC and thus differs from the
actual beta due to measurement error. This causes an attenuation bias. Another reason is that, for
public targets, investment bankers may upward-adjust (downward-adjust) the market risk premium
they use to compute the WACC if the DCF-implied value of the target exceeds (falls short of) its
current market capitalization by a sufficiently large amount. Adjusting the market risk premium
– and thus the WACC – in this manner in order to bring the fairness opinion closer to the current
market price naturally reduces the coefficient estimate on Target Asset Beta in our regressions.
We next test another basic implication of using the CAPM: The bidder’s assessment of the
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target’s value is decreasing in its asset beta.35 Specifically, we estimate the following OLS regression:
Bid-Implied Valuation = α+ β × Target Asset Beta + γ × Beta Spread
α+ δ′Deal Controls + η′Target Controls + κ′Bidder Controls
α+ Bidder Industry × Year Fixed Effects + ε. (20)
Bid-Implied Valuation is the value of the target as implied by the takeover bid. All other variables
are defined as before. The standard errors are clustered by target industry.
Panel B of Table 8 presents the results. In column (1), we use the natural logarithm of the
value of the bid (in USD million) as the dependent variable.36 In column (2), the outcome variable
is the bid-implied firm value (FV ) of the target scaled by its sales. In column (3), we scale the
bid-implied firm value by the target’s EBIT.37 To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient
estimates and associated t-statistics for the control variables.
In all three columns, we find negative and statistically significant coefficient estimates on Target
Asset Beta. This is important for three reasons. First, it corroborates the premise that managers
rely on the CAPM to compute the discount rate. Second, it supports the basic prediction that,
all else equal, the bidder’s assessment of the target’s value is decreasing in the target’s asset beta.
Third, it suggests that acquisitions of targets with high asset betas do not generate larger synergies
than acquisitions of low beta targets. Otherwise, one would expect the bid-implied valuations to
be increasing in the targets’ asset betas. This last point is important as it implies that the positive
relation between a bidder’s CAR and target’s asset beta that we predict (and find) is unlikely to
be driven by a positive correlation between the target’s beta and the potential for synergies.
35Specifically, our framework implies ∂Et/∂βA = − (µ× FCFt+1) / [rf + βA × µ− g]2 < 0.
36As a consequence, we do not include Deal Value (Log) as a control variable in column (1).
37Information on sales and EBIT is missing for non-U.S. targets in our sample. For this reason, the indicator for
cross-boarder bids (Crossborder) is not included in columns (2) to (3).
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5.2 Do CAPM-Betas Correlate with Future Cash Flows?
A potential concern regarding the interpretation of our findings is that asset betas may be correlated
with firms’ expected free cash flows and/or the synergies that can be generated by a takeover. In
that case, bids for high beta targets may entail higher bidder CARs because acquisitions of high
beta firms create more value. We thus examine the relation between firms’ asset betas and future
(realized) free cash flows as well as the relation between a target’s asset beta and the combined
cumulative abnormal return of the bidder and target.
We begin by examining the relation between asset betas and future (realized) free cash flows by
estimating the following OLS regression for all public firms in Compustat between 1977 and 2015:
FCF
Assets
= α+ β ×Asset Beta + γ′Firm Characteristics + Year Fixed Effects + ε. (21)
FCF/Assets is free cash flows scaled by total assets.38 Firm Characteristics comprises the
following variables: Market Capitalization (Log), Market-to-Book, Cash to Assets, Debt to Assets,
ROA, and Cash Flow to Assets. All variables are defined as before. The standard errors are
clustered by industry.
[Table 9 around here.]
Table 9 presents the results. We do not find any evidence of a relation between asset betas and
future free cash flows. This result suggests that the relation between bidder CARs and target asset
betas that we find is unlikely to be driven by a correlation between asset betas and free cash flows.
38Specifically, we compute FCF/Assets as [EBIT× (1− τ) + D&A− CAPEX−∆NWC] /ASSETS, where τ de-
notes the tax rate, D&A depreciation and amortization, CAPEX capital expenditures, ∆NWC the increase in net
working capital, and ASSETS the book value of total assets.
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5.3 Do CAPM-Betas Correlate with Synergies?
Next, we assess the relation between synergies and asset betas by regressing the combined cu-
mulative abnormal return of a bidder and target (Combined CAR) on the target’s asset beta.39
Specifically, we estimate the following OLS regression:
Combined CAR = α+ β × Target Asset Beta + γ × Beta Spread
α+ δ′Deal Controls + η′Target Controls + κ′Bidder Controls
α+ Bidder Industry × Year Fixed Effects + ε. (22)
All variables are defined as before. The standard errors are clustered by target industry.
[Table 10 around here.]
Table 10 presents the results. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates
and corresponding t-statistics for the control variables. We do not find any evidence of a relation
between Target Asset Beta and Combined CAR, suggesting that the relation between bidder CARs
and target asset betas that we document is not driven by unobserved differences in synergies
between low and high beta targets.
6 Are CAPM-Using Managers Rational?
6.1 Why Do Managers Use the CAPM?
A question raised by our findings is why managers rely on the CAPM despite the divergence
between CAPM-implied and realized returns? This (ultimately empirical) question is not the focus
of our paper. Instead, our aim is to explore the consequences of using the CAPM. Distinguishing
between the different possible reasons for using the CAPM is an interesting avenue for future
39A caveat is that we can compute the combined CAR of bidders and targets only if the target is public.
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research and may be achieved, for example, using surveys in the spirit of Graham and Harvey
(2001), Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005), or Mukhlynina and Nyborg (2016). However,
in what follows, we delineate a number of possible explanations for the widespread use of the
CAPM in practice. Following Baker and Wurgler (2013), we can distinguish between rational
managers/irrational markets and irrational managers/rational markets.
One possibility is that managers are fully rational: Returns deviate from the CAPM in the
short-run but the CAPM ultimately holds in the long-run. Hence, it can be optimal for rational
managers to use the CAPM if their goal is to maximize long-term value and if they are not financially
constrained (Stein, 1996). Further, because stocks are backed not only by the firms’ investment
projects but also by the real options to start, modify, or abandon these projects, it is possible that
the expected returns on stocks do not satisfy the CAPM even though the expected returns of the
individual investment projects do (Berk, Green, and Naik, 1999; Da, Guo, and Jagannathan, 2012).
Another possibility is that managers are irrational, and the CAPM is not a good model of
expected returns: Investors are rational and managers irrationally rely on the CAPM. In the
simplest case, they may not be aware of the empirical shortcomings of the CAPM and the relation
between bidder CARs and target asset betas. Further, learning about this relation may be hampered
by the fact that most managers experience only a limited number of takeover bids and thus only
receive infrequent, noisy feedback on their M&A decisions. Investment bankers who advise the
firms experience a larger number of deals but are typically organized in sector teams and specialize
on particular industries. As a result, they may not experience sufficient variation in target betas
to learn about their relation with bidder CARs.
Finally, it is possible that managers and/or bankers are aware of the fact that realized returns
differ from CAPM-implied returns but prefer the CAPM to alternative models that are more
complicated to implement or explain to clients and superiors. They may also underestimate the
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importance of accurately estimating the cost of capital. Mukhlynina and Nyborg (2016, p. 1), for
example, quote one of the respondents to their survey among valuation professionals as saying:
“There seem to be lots of academics asking how analysts in the real world use CAPM or calculate
the cost of capital. The answer is, people don’t waste time on this. No one ever lost/made money
because they calculated the WACC better than consensus.”
6.2 A Suggestive Test
It is difficult to test the different alternatives above against one another, but we offer here evidence
suggesting that CAPM-using managers may not be rational. We do so by regressing long-run
abnormal returns of the bidders on the asset betas of the targets. The hypothesis is that, if the
CAPM is a good representation of expected long-run returns, then bids for low beta targets should
entail negative bidder CARs (as previously shown) that subsequently mean-revert (over longer
horizons) as the market eventually learns that managers where right to use the CAPM.
We thus compute the buy-and-hold abnormal return for each bidder (Bidder BHAR) over
different horizons and estimate the following OLS regression:
Bidder BHAR = α+ β × Target Asset Beta + γ × Beta Spread
α+ δ′Deal Controls + η′Target Controls + κ′Bidder Controls
α+ Bidder Industry × Year Fixed Effects + ε. (23)
All variables are defined as before. The standard errors are clustered by target industry.
[Table 11 around here.]
Table 11 presents the results. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates and
corresponding t-statistics for the control variables. Column (1) mirrors the findings of Table 2.
The buy-and-hold abnormal return of the bidder’s stock in the seven-day window around the bid
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announcement is increasing in the target’s asset beta. Columns (2) to (5) show that we do not find
any evidence of subsequent reversal in the returns. The abnormal buy-and-hold returns are not
statistically different from zero starting from four trading days and up to 400 trading days after the
bid announcement. The positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates in columns (6) to
(9) corroborate this finding: Bidders’ buy-and-hold abnormal returns from three trading days prior
to the bid announcement up to 400 trading days after the announcement are positively related to
the targets’ asset beta. This finding suggests that bidders’ reliance on the CAPM for valuation
purposes has long-lasting effects on investors’ wealth. Table 11 thus presents tentative evidence
that it may be irrational for managers to rely on the CAPM even though it is not an accurate
model of expected returns, but this last test lacks power.
7 Conclusion
The CAPM is the predominant model of risk and return taught by academics and used by practi-
tioners to estimate the cost of capital. However, the CAPM does not fit the data: The empirical
SML is flatter than the CAPM implies. We predict and find that the widespread use of the CAPM
for capital budgeting and valuation purposes despite the divergence between CAPM-implied and
realized returns has important implications for the market’s reaction to firms’ investment decisions.
In the context of mergers and acquisitions, we show that acquirers experience significantly lower
cumulative abnormal returns when announcing bids for low beta targets than for high beta targets.
We estimate the average loss per deal incurred by acquirers due to their reliance on the CAPM to
be USD 37 million, corresponding to 12% of the average deal value and implying aggregate losses
to bidders in excess of USD 10 billion per year. Relying on the CAPM also has implications for
firms’ financing and capital structure decisions: Low (high) beta firms are less (more) likely to offer
stock rather than cash when making takeover bids, less (more) likely to issue equity, and more
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(less) likely to repurchase shares.
The normative implications of our study ultimately depend on how the debate about the veracity
of the CAPM is settled. One view is that the CAPM holds in the long-run, but its long-run validity
is hard to test (Stein, 1996). According to this view, managers are right to use the CAPM, and
our findings reflect that the market is temporarily mistaken about value creation. In favor of this
interpretation is Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2009), who find that betas based on accounting
cash flows forecast long-term returns (unlike simple OLS betas based on monthly stock returns).
An alternative view is that the CAPM fails to explain expected returns, even in the long-run.
This view is vindicated by the fact that the asset pricing literature has failed to find any conclusive
evidence in favor of the CAPM, even its conditional form. In this case, the normative implication
of our paper is that managers should adopt a flatter SML than the CAPM suggests. For instance,
they could shrink the beta estimates more aggressively, as suggested by Levi and Welch (2016).
Yet another alternative could be to estimate discount rates based on characteristics that have been
shown to predict realized returns (e.g., Daniel and Titman, 1997).
One implication of our findings, however, is clear: The simple textbook version of the CAPM
in combination with OLS betas estimated based on monthly excess returns should not be used to
compute firms’ cost of capital.
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Figure 1: Model Calibration
This figure shows the model-implied cumulative abnormal return of a bidder’s stock in response to a bid announcement
as a function of the target’s asset beta for different degrees of steepness of the empirical SML. The bidder’s cumulative
abnormal return is computed as CARBiddert = ρ × pi×FCFt+1EBiddert ×
[
1
rf+(γ×βA+1−γ)×µ−g −
1
rf+βA×µ−g
]
. The different
model parameters are calibrated to match the average values in our sample of bids made by public bidders for private
targets between 1977 and 2015. Specifically, we use ρ = 92%,
pi×FCFt+1
EBiddert
= 0.153%, rf = 5%, µ = 6%, and g = 5.4%.
We consider three different degrees of steepness of the empirical SML: γ = 0 (blue dashed line), γ = 0.5 (blue solid
line), and γ = 1 (gray dashed line). The figure also shows the OLS coefficient estimates of indicator variables for
different ranges of βA (relative to the base case of βA = 0.9, the average asset beta of the private targets in the
sample) as reported in Table A.3 in the appendix (red solid line).
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Figure 2: Private vs. Public Targets
This figure shows the OLS coefficient estimates of indicator variables for different ranges of βA (relative to the base
case of βA = 0.9, the average asset beta of the private targets in the sample) for the sample of private targets (left
panel) and the sample of public targets (right panel) as reported in Table A.4 in the appendix. The sample period
is 1977 to 2015.
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
Bi
dd
er
 C
AR
 (%
)
0 .5 1 1.5
Target Asset Beta
90% confidence interval
Private Targets
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
Bi
dd
er
 C
AR
 (%
)
0 .5 1 1.5
Target Asset Beta
90% confidence interval
Public Targets
38
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for our sample of bids for private (Panel A) and public (Panel B) targets between 1977 and 2015. Bidder CAR is the
bidder’s cumulative abnormal return around the bid announcement. Target (Bidder) Asset Beta is the target’s (bidder’s) asset beta. Beta Spread is the difference
between the target’s and bidder’s asset beta. Deal Value is the value of the bid (in $M). 100% Stock is an indicator for all-stock offers. WACC is the discount
rate used in M&A fairness opinions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Detailed definitions are provided in the appendix.
Panel A – Private Targets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample: Bids for Private Targets with a CPI-Adjusted Deal Value ≥ $50M, 1977-2015
Variable: Observations Mean SD Min. p25 p50 p75 Max.
Bidder CAR 14,744 2.0% 8.2% -20.5% -2.3% 1.1% 5.6% 27.9%
Target Asset Beta 17,885 0.86 0.33 0.17 0.62 0.86 1.11 1.55
Bidder Asset Beta 18,163 0.87 0.32 0.20 0.64 0.84 1.11 1.54
Beta Spread 17,707 -0.01 0.25 -0.74 -0.06 0.00 0.03 0.76
Deal Value (Log) 18,485 4.91 1.07 3.29 4.09 4.70 5.52 9.08
Deal Value (in $M) 18,485 297 699 27 60 110 250 8,799
Deal Value (in $M, CPI-Adjusted) 18,485 388 882 51 82 148 334 11,437
100% Stock 18,482 0.13 0.33 0 0 0 0 1
WACC 117 14.1% 4.9% 7.0% 11.0% 13.0% 15.0% 30.0%
Panel B – Public Targets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample: Bids for Public Targets with a CPI-Adjusted Deal Value ≥ $50M, 1977-2015
Variable: Observations Mean SD Min. p25 p50 p75 Max.
Bidder CAR 7,296 -0.6% 7.7% -20.5% -4.6% -0.7% 3.1% 27.9%
Target Asset Beta 7,879 0.82 0.36 0.17 0.53 0.82 1.11 1.55
Bidder Asset Beta 7,932 0.81 0.34 0.20 0.55 0.80 1.09 1.54
Beta Spread 7,794 0.01 0.21 -0.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.76
Deal Value (Log) 8,095 5.59 1.49 3.29 4.38 5.33 6.55 9.08
Deal Value (in $M) 8,095 921 1,852 27 80 206 699 8,799
Deal Value (in $M, CPI-Adjusted) 8,095 1,258 2,430 51 121 307 1,019 11,437
100% Stock 8,091 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 1 1
WACC 1,064 13.1% 3.9% 7.0% 10.5% 12.3% 14.5% 30.0%
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Table 2: Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of Bidders’ Stock around Bid Announcements
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock during
the seven-day window around the bid announcement (Bidder CAR) to the target’s asset beta. The sample period
is 1977 to 2015. Only bids for private targets are included. Target (Bidder) Controls is a vector of target (bidder)
characteristics: Market-to-Book, ROA, Cash Flow to Assets, Debt to Assets, and Cash to Assets. For private targets,
these variables are average values of the corresponding variables across all public firms in Compustat with the same
three-digit primary SIC code. All other variables are defined as in Table 1. Detailed definitions of all variables are
provided in the appendix. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported
in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta 1.02*** 1.34*** 1.73*** 1.49*** 2.55***
(3.02) (4.20) (4.72) (4.14) (5.06)
Beta Spread -1.36***
(-2.60)
Deal Value (Log) 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.59*** 0.59***
(7.37) (7.34) (6.82) (6.69)
Equity 0.59** 0.60** 0.57* 0.51*
(2.24) (2.26) (1.87) (1.69)
Cash 0.30 0.28 0.48 0.44
(1.07) (0.98) (1.45) (1.34)
Toehold -0.08 -0.15 -0.11 -0.10
(-0.20) (-0.36) (-0.26) (-0.24)
Hostile -2.26** -2.44** -2.82** -3.22***
(-2.19) (-2.26) (-2.26) (-2.76)
Same Industry 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14
(0.65) (0.71) (0.82) (0.96)
Crossborder -0.14 -0.14 -0.06 -0.09
(-0.63) (-0.61) (-0.26) (-0.37)
Poison -0.60 -0.66 -0.51 -0.47
(-0.87) (-0.90) (-0.49) (-0.45)
Tender -0.30 -0.36 -0.57 -0.72
(-0.29) (-0.34) (-0.49) (-0.63)
Multiple Bidders -0.40 -0.38 0.07 0.03
(-0.54) (-0.51) (0.09) (0.04)
Relative Size -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06***
(-7.25) (-7.20) (-7.51) (-7.59)
Bidder Size (Log) -0.94*** -0.94*** -0.96*** -0.96***
(-12.40) (-12.33) (-12.50) (-12.56)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No No Yes Yes
Observations 13,916 13,599 13,486 12,209 12,109
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Table 3: Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable Estimation
This table presents 2SLS estimates of the sensitivity of Bidder CAR to Target Asset Beta. The sample period is 1980 to 2015. Only bids for private targets are
included. Deal Controls is a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in columns (2) to (4) of Table 2: Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold, Hostile,
Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed
definitions are provided in the appendix. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A – 1st Stage of 2SLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5.a) (5.b)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Target Target Target Target Target Beta
Asset Beta Asset Beta Asset Beta Asset Beta Asset Beta Spread
Target Noise Beta 3.43*** 3.40*** 2.18*** 2.19*** 2.24*** 2.34***
(11.08) (11.44) (15.8) (15.76) (15.16) (13.23)
Bidder Noise Beta -0.15 -2.46***
(1.06) (12.01)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,385 13,081 12,972 11,740 11,739 11,739
Panel B – 2nd Stage of 2SLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta (instrumented) 1.86** 2.09** 3.03** 2.83* 4.45*
(2.09) (2.41) (1.99) (1.72) (1.72)
Beta Spread (instrumented) -2.32
(1.18)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No No Yes Yes
Observations 13,385 13,081 12,972 11,740 11,739
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Table 4: Cross-Sectional Variation
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock during the
seven-day window around the bid announcement (Bidder CAR) to the target’s asset beta as function of cross-sectional
characteristics. The sample period is 1977 to 2015. Only bids for private targets are included. High Growth is an
indicator equal to one if the compound annual growth rate of aggregate sales in the target’s (SIC3-)industry during
the three years preceding the takeover bid is larger than the sample median. High Relative Size is an indicator equal
to one if Relative Size is larger than the sample median. CAPM Usage is an indicator equal to one if the bidder’s
10K, 10Q, or 8K filings of the three years prior to the bid announcement contain the words “CAPM” or “Capital
Asset Pricing Model.” Deal Controls is a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in column (5) of Table 2:
Beta Spread, Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple
Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions
are provided in the appendix. (Interacted) indicates that all control variables and fixed effects are interacted with
the cross-sectional characteristic of interest, allowing their coefficients to depend on the value of High Growth, High
Relative Size, and CAPM Usage, respectively. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-)
industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and
***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta × High Growth 2.71**
(2.08)
Target Asset Beta × High Relative Size 2.86**
(2.31)
Target Asset Beta × CAPM Usage 10.95**
(2.03)
Target Asset Beta 1.44* 1.39** 2.37***
(1.93) (2.07) (4.24)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,518 11,503 12,109
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Table 5: Bidder CAR – Private vs. Public Targets
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock during
the seven-day window around the bid announcement (Bidder CAR) to the target’s asset beta. The sample period is
1977 to 2015. 1 {Target Asset Beta in Bottom (Top) Quartile} is an indicator equal to one if the target’s asset beta
is in the bottom (top) quartile of the distribution. min {Target Asset Beta, 0.7} is the minimum of Target Asset Beta
and 0. max {Target Asset Beta− 0.7, 0} is the maximum of Target Asset Beta − 0.7 and 0. Deal Controls is a vector
comprising all deal-level controls included in column (5) of Table 2: Beta Spread, Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash,
Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log).
All other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in the appendix. t-statistics based on
standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample: Private Targets Public Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta 2.55*** 0.40
(5.06) (0.32)
1 {Target Asset Beta -0.59** -1.20**
1 { in Bottom Quartile} (-2.09) (-2.36)
1 {Target Asset Beta 0.88*** -0.04
1 { in Top Quartile} (3.27) (-0.07)
min {Target Asset Beta, 0.7} 3.20*** 3.90**
(3.18) (2.06)
max {Target Asset Beta− 0.7, 0} 2.25*** -1.20
(3.67) (-0.77)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,109 12,109 12,109 3,894 3,894 3,894
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Table 6: Method of Payment
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the propensity to offer an all-stock payment to the bidder’s
asset beta (Bidder Asset Beta). The sample period is 1977 to 2015. 100% Stock is an indicator equal to one if the
proposed payment is 100% stock. All other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided
in the appendix. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the bidder’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in
parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: Private and Public Targets
Dependent Variable: 100% Stock
Bidder Asset Beta 9.50*** 13.58*** 8.20*** 7.95*** 8.26***
(4.01) (6.60) (5.23) (4.65) (4.61)
Target Asset Beta -1.22
(-0.53)
Deal Value (Log) 3.41*** 3.47*** 3.47*** 3.49***
(7.00) (7.04) (7.05) (7.10)
Toehold -7.11*** -6.22*** -6.38*** -6.41***
(-2.93) (-2.64) (-2.67) (-2.69)
Hostile -7.57*** -8.48*** -8.84*** -8.75***
(-3.99) (-3.65) (-3.79) (-3.75)
Same Industry 0.39 0.09 0.04 -0.02
(0.30) (0.11) (0.04) (-0.02)
Crossborder -5.55*** -5.45*** -5.33*** -5.15***
(-5.47) (-5.58) (-5.58) (-5.59)
Poison 15.91*** 16.16*** 16.18*** 15.94***
(8.71) (8.81) (9.10) (9.23)
Tender -16.92*** -16.05*** -15.75*** -15.81***
(-10.28) (-10.52) (-10.55) (-10.60)
Multiple Bidders -0.37 -0.42 -0.43 -0.39
(-0.28) (-0.27) (-0.28) (-0.25)
Relative Size -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.12***
(-3.57) (-3.00) (-3.13) (-3.17)
Bidder Size (Log) -1.52*** -1.26*** -1.27*** -1.28***
(-4.97) (-4.44) (-4.40) (-4.41)
Target SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No No No Yes Yes
Observations 25,772 21,063 18,762 18,423 18,348
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Table 7: Share Repurchases and Seasoned Equity Offerings
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the propensity to repurchase shares (Repurchase) and to
conduct seasoned equity offerings (SEO) to the firm’s asset beta (Asset Beta). The sample period is 1977 to 2015.
All public firms in Compustat are included. Detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the appendix. t-
statistics based on standard errors clustered by the firm’s (SIC2-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Public Firms in Compustat
Dependent Variable: Repurchaset SEOt
Asset Betat−1 -10.95*** -11.01*** 18.33*** 17.07***
(-5.45) (-6.49) (10.68) (10.56)
Market Capitalizationt−1 (Log) 4.86*** 4.91***
(21.74) (18.33)
Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.42*** 0.38***
(-6.79) (3.81)
Cash to Assetst−1 -2.72 1.43
(-0.79) (0.53)
Debt to Assetst−1 -10.77*** -3.37
(-5.30) (-1.09)
ROAt−1 2.60 9.25**
(0.77) (2.46)
Cash Flow to Assetst−1 4.12 -13.70***
(1.19) (-3.24)
SIC2 Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 319,143 219,486 318,771 219,162
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Table 8: Discount Rate Used in M&A Fairness Opinions and Bid-Implied Target Valuations
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the discount rate (WACC ) used in fairness opinions on
proposed M&A transactions (Panel A) and bid-implied target valuations (Panel B) to the target’s asset beta. The
sample period is 1977 to 2015. Public Target is an indicator for public targets. FV/Sales and FV/EBIT are the
ratios of the target’s bid-implied firm value to its sales and EBIT, respectively. Deal Controls is a vector comprising
Beta Spread, Deal Value (Log) (omitted in column (1) of Panel B), Equity, Cash, Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry,
Crossborder (omitted in columns (2) and (3) of Panel B), Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder
Size (Log). All other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in the appendix. t-statistics
based on standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A (1) (2) (3)
Sample: Private and Public Targets
Dependent Variable: WACC Used in DCF Analysis (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta 3.03*** 3.69*** 3.99***
(5.76) (12.92) (11.19)
Beta Spread -1.81**
(-2.46)
Deal Value (Log) -1.30*** -1.30***
(-8.90) (-9.17)
Public Target -0.88*** -0.94***
(-2.85) (-2.99)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,174 1,174 1,171
Panel B (1) (2) (3)
Sample: Private and Public Targets
Dependent Variable: Deal Value (Log) FV/Sales FV/EBIT
Target Asset Beta -0.20*** -2.58*** -8.47***
(-2.63) (-2.72) (-2.66)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,370 4,196 3,116
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Table 9: Future Realized Free Cash Flows
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of a firm’s realized free cash flows in future periods scaled by
total assets (FCF/Assets) to the firm’s lagged asset beta. All reported coefficient estimates have been multiplied
with 100 to improve readability. The sample period is 1977 to 2015. All public firms in Compustat are included.
Detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the appendix. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by
(SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *,
**, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Public Firms in Compustat
Dependent Variable: FCFtAssetst
FCFt+1
Assetst+1
FCFt+2
Assetst+2
FCFt+3
Assetst+3
Asset Betat−1 -0.32 -0.10 -0.34 -0.43
(-0.20) (-0.06) (-0.22) (-0.29)
Market Capitalizationt−1 (Log) 1.06*** 1.29*** 1.45*** 1.47***
(4.42) (4.94) (5.87) (6.16)
Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.42*** -0.40*** -0.34*** -0.29***
(-6.22) (-5.58) (-4.81) (-3.66)
Cash to Assetst−1 -17.14*** -16.07*** -15.04*** -14.30***
(-6.50) (-4.65) (-3.88) (-3.50)
Debt to Assetst−1 5.18*** 4.67*** 3.80** 3.28**
(3.22) (2.78) (2.21) (1.98)
ROAt−1 -4.84 4.09 2.81 7.43
(-0.51) (0.41) (0.36) (0.89)
Cash Flow to Assetst−1 36.21*** 24.57** 22.96*** 15.86*
(3.54) (2.33) (2.83) (1.88)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 208,399 187,045 168,898 152,541
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Table 10: Combined CAR of Bidder and Target
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the combined cumulative abnormal returns of the bidder’s
and target’s stock during the seven-day window around the bid announcement (Combined CAR) to the target’s asset
beta. The sample period is 1977 to 2015. Only public targets are included. Deal Controls is a vector comprising
all deal-level controls included in column (5) of Table 2: Beta Spread, Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold,
Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All
other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in the appendix. t-statistics based on
standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Public Targets
Dependent Variable: Combined CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta -0.60 -0.21 -0.71 0.45
(-1.07) (-0.28) (-0.82) (0.40)
Beta Spread -1.63
(-1.59)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 5,079 4,952 4,324 4,273
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Table 11: Bidder Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR)
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the buy-and-hold abnormal return of the bidder’s stock over different event windows (Bidder BHAR) to
the target’s asset beta. [x,y] denotes an event window from t = x to t = y for a bid announced on date t = 0. The sample period is 1977 to 2015. Only bids for
private targets are included. Deal Controls is a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in column (5) of Table 2: Beta Spread, Deal Value (Log), Equity,
Cash, Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as
in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in the appendix. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in
parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder BHAR (in Percentage Points)
Event Window: [-3,+3] [+4,+100] [+4,+200] [+4,+300] [+4,+400] [-3,+100] [-3,+200] [-3,+300] [-3,+400]
Target Asset Beta 2.75*** 0.42 2.82 4.50 6.47 3.63* 6.21** 7.49* 8.95*
(4.29) (0.22) (0.96) (1.09) (1.35) (1.75) (2.08) (1.88) (1.88)
Bidder SDC Ind. × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,281 10,220 10,038 9,817 9,578 10,219 10,037 9,816 9,577
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Variable Definition
Above 50% Stock Indicator equal to one if the proposed payment consists of more than 50% stock.
Asset Beta Equally weighted average asset beta of all public firms in CRSP with the same three-
digit primary SIC code. Asset betas are computed as βA = βE/ [1 + (1− τ)×D/E],
where βE is the equity beta, τ is the statutory tax rate in the highest bracket,
D is total debt (DLT + DLC), and E is the market value of equity. Using
alternative methodologies to delever the equity betas does not materially affect
the results. Equity betas are estimated by regressing five years of monthly ex-
cess returns (RET minus the risk-free rate obtained from Kenneth French’s web-
page, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html) on
excess returns of the CRSP value-weighted portfolio (including dividends). We use
CRSP sharecodes 10 and 11 and compute the value-weighted average beta in case
of multiple securities per firm. We drop estimates based on less than 36 months of
return data. Further, we drop observations for which the estimated beta is negative,
and we drop the same number of observations in the right tail of the distribution of
estimated betas.
Beta Spread Target Asset Beta minus Bidder Asset Beta.
Beta Spread (Equity) Target Equity Beta minus Bidder Equity Beta.
Bidder Asset Beta Equally weighted average asset beta of all public firms in CRSP with the same three-
digit primary SIC code as the bidder, estimated one month prior to the bid announce-
ment. (See Asset Beta for details of the estimation of individual betas.)
Bidder BHAR Buy-and-hold abnormal return of the bidder’s stock. [x,y] denotes an event window
from t = x to t = y for a bid announced on date t = 0. The buy-and-hold abnormal
return for bidder i is given by BHARi ≡ BHi − BHMatchi , where BHi is the buy-
and-hold return of bidder i (during the event window from t = x to t = y), and
BHMatchi is the buy-and-hold return on a portfolio of firms matched to bidder i based
on industry, size, and Tobin’s Q (e.g., Savor and Lu, 2009). We first match bidder
i to all public firms in CRSP with the same three-digit primary SIC code. Next,
we compute the Mahalanobis distance to all matched firms in terms of size and
Tobin’s Q to identify the ten closest industry peers. BHMatchi is then computed as
the weighted average buy-and-hold return of these ten closest industry peers, where
the weights are chosen such that closer peers receive greater weight. If there are less
than ten peers (because there are not enough firms in the same industry), the matched
portfolio contains less than ten firms. The weight assigned to peer j of bidder i is
wi,j = K (di,j/hi) /
∑Ni
k=1K (di,k/hi), where Ni is the number of peers matched to
bidder i, di,j is the Mahalanobis distance between bidder i and peer j, K (·) is the
Gaussian density function, and hi is equal to the Mahalanobis distance to the nearest
matched peer (see, e.g., Todd, 1999).
Bidder CAR Cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock over the seven-day window around
the bid announcement (i.e., from t = −3 to t = +3 for a bid announced on date t = 0).
Abnormal returns are market adjusted returns of CRSP sharecodes 10 and 11, using
the CRSP value-weighted portfolio as the market proxy. Outliers are dropped by
trimming the final distribution of CARs at the 0.5% level in each tail.
Bidder Equity Beta Equally weighted average equity beta of all public firms in CRSP with the same
three-digit primary SIC code as the bidder, estimated one month prior to the bid
announcement. (See Asset Beta for details of the estimation of individual betas.)
Bidder Noise Beta Equally weighted average noise beta of all public firms in CRSP with the same three-
digit primary SIC code as the bidder, estimated one month prior to the bid announce-
ment. (See Noise Beta for details of the estimation of individual betas.)
Bidder Size (Log) Natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the bidder in USD million four days
prior to the bid announcement.
51
Variable Definition
CAPM Usage Indicator equal to one if the bidder’s 10K, 10Q, or 8K filings of the
three years prior to the bid announcement contain the words “CAPM”
or “Capital Asset Pricing Model.”
Cash Indicator equal to one if the proposed payment includes cash.
Cash Flow to Assets Net income (ib) + D&A (dp) / total assets (at).
Cash to Assets Total cash and cash equivalents (che) / total assets (at).
Combined CAR Weighted average of the cumulative abnormal returns of the bidder’s
and target’s stock over the seven-day window around the bid announce-
ment. (See Bidder CAR for details of the estimation of the cumulative
abnormal returns.)
Crossborder Indicator equal to one if the target’s and bidder’s headquarters are lo-
cated in different countries.
Deal Value (Log) Natural logarithm of the value of the takeover bid in USD million.
Deal Value (in $M) Value of the takeover bid in USD million.
Deal Value (in $M, CPI-Adjusted) Inflation-adjusted value of the takeover bid in USD million (in December
2015 terms).
Debt to Assets Total debt (dlc + dltt) / total assets (at).
Equity Indicator equal to one if the proposed payment includes stock.
FCF/Assets [EBIT× (1− τ) + D&A− CAPEX−∆NWC] /ASSETS, where EBIT
is earnings before interest and taxes (Compustat item ebit, or oiadp
if ebit is missing, or pi + xint − spi − nopi if both ebit and oiadp
are missing), τ is the statutory tax rate in the highest bracket, D&A
is depreciation and amortization (Compustat item dp, or xdp if dp is
missing, or dpc if both dp and xdp are missing), CAPEX is capital ex-
penditures (Compustat item capx, or capxv if capx is missing), ∆NWC
is the increase in net working capital (Compustat items recch + invch
+ apalch + aoloch, or if missing: − (rect − rectt−1) − (invt − invtt−1
) + ( ap − apt−1) − (aco − lco − acot−1 + lcot−1)), and ASSETS is
the book value of total assets (Compustat item at).
FV Bid-implied firm value of the target, defined as EV + ASSETS − BVE.
EV is the bid-implied equity value of the target, defined as the equity
value indicated in SDC, or the deal value divided by the percentage of
equity acquired if the equity value is missing but the deal is completed,
or the deal value divided by the percentage of equity sought if the equity
value is missing and the deal is withdrawn. ASSETS is the book value of
total assets (Compustat item at), and BVE is the book value of equity
(Compustat item ceq).
FV/EBIT Bid-implied firm value of the target divided by the target’s EBIT.
FV/Sales Bid-implied firm value of the target divided by the target’s sales.
High Growth Indicator equal to one if the compound annual growth rate of aggregate
sales in the target’s (SIC3-)industry during the three years preceding
the takeover bid is larger than the sample median.
High Relative Size Indicator equal to one if Relative Size is larger than the sample median.
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Variable Definition
HMFFS Dollar amount of hypothetical mutual fund fire sales, assuming that each
position in an affected fund’s portfolio is liquidated in proportion to its
portfolio weight, scaled by the dollar volume of trading in the stock.
Hostile Indicator equal to one if the initial bid is hostile.
Market Capitalization (Log) Natural logarithm of the market value of equity in USD million.
Market-to-Book Market capitalization (prc × csho) / shareholders’ equity (ceq).
max {Target Asset Beta− 0.7, 0} Maximum of Target Asset Beta − 0.7 and 0.
min {Target Asset Beta, 0.7} Minimum of Target Asset Beta and 0.7.
Multiple Bidders Indicator equal to one if there is more than one bidder.
Noise Beta In-sample covariance between the estimated noise component in a firm’s
realized excess stock returns and the realized excess returns on the market
proxy, scaled by the in-sample variance of the excess market returns. The
noise components are estimated as the fitted values from a regression of
realized excess returns on hypothetical mutual fund fire sales. Individual
firms’ noise betas are delevered and aggregated at the industry level in
analogy to the construction of Asset Beta.
Poison Indicator equal to one if the target uses a defense mechanism.
Public Target Indicator equal to one if the target is listed.
Relative Size Deal value divided by the market capitalization of the bidder four days
prior to the bid announcement.
Repurchase Indicator equal to one if a firm repurchases shares.
ROA Return on assets (ib / at).
Same Industry Indicator equal to one if the bidder and target operate in the same industry
as defined by the first three digits of their primary SIC codes.
SEO Indicator equal to one if a firm does a seasoned equity offering.
Stock vs. Cash Indicator equal to one (zero) if 100% of the proposed payment is in stock
(cash). Deals for which the proposed payment comprises both stock and
cash are excluded.
Target Asset Beta Equally weighted average asset beta of all public firms in CRSP with the
same three-digit primary SIC code as the target, estimated one month
prior to the bid announcement. (See Asset Beta for details of the estima-
tion of individual betas.)
Target Equity Beta Equally weighted average equity beta of all public firms in CRSP with
the same three-digit primary SIC code as the target, estimated one month
prior to the bid announcement. (See Asset Beta for details of the estima-
tion of individual betas.)
Target Noise Beta Equally weighted average noise beta of all public firms in CRSP with the
same three-digit primary SIC code as the target, estimated one month
prior to the bid announcement. (See Noise Beta for details of the estima-
tion of individual betas.)
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Variable Definition
Tender Indicator equal to one if the bid is a tender offer.
Toehold Fraction of the target’s equity held by the bidder before the bid.
WACC Average of the high and low discount rates (SDC items
FO DCF RATE HI and FO DCF RATE LOW) used for dis-
counted cash flow analyses in M&A fairness opinions.
100% Stock Indicator equal to one if 100% of the offered payment is in stock.
1 {a < Target Asset Beta ≤ b} Indicator equal to one if the target’s asset beta is larger than a
but smaller than (or equal to) b.
1 {Target Asset Beta in Bottom Quartile} Indicator equal to one if the target’s asset beta is in the bottom
quartile of the distribution.
1 {Target Asset Beta in Top Quartile} Indicator equal to one if the target’s asset beta is in the top
quartile of the distribution.
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Figure A.1: Non-Parametric Regression of Target Asset Beta on Target Noise Beta
This figure shows the coefficient estimates from an OLS regression of Target Asset Beta on indicator variables for
different ranges of Target Noise Beta. The sample period is 1980 to 2015.
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Table A.1: Alternative CAR Models
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock during
the seven-day window around the bid announcement (Bidder CAR) to the target’s asset beta. The sample period is
1977 to 2015. Only bids for private targets are included. In column (1), Bidder CAR is defined as the return of the
bidder’s stock minus the return of the CRSP value-weighted portfolio. In column (2), Bidder CAR is defined as the
return of the bidder’s stock minus the expected return implied by the CAPM. In columns (3) and (4), Bidder CAR is
defined as the return of the bidder’s stock minus the expected return implied by the Fama-French three factor model
(Fama and French, 1993) and Carhart four factor model (Carhart, 1997), respectively. Deal Controls is a vector
comprising all deal-level controls included in column (5) of Table 2: Beta Spread, Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash,
Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log).
All other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in the appendix. t-statistics based on
standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
CAR Model: Market Adjusted Market Model 3 Factors 4 Factors
Target Asset Beta 2.55*** 2.19*** 2.13*** 2.23***
(5.06) (4.61) (4.43) (4.66)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,109 12,061 12,061 12,060
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Table A.2: Sensitivity of Bidder CAR to Target Equity Beta
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock during
the seven-day window around the bid announcement (Bidder CAR) to the target’s equity beta. The sample period
is 1977 to 2015. Only bids for private targets are included. Target Equity Beta is the equity beta of the target.
Beta Spread (Equity) is the difference between the target’s and the bidder’s equity beta. Deal Controls is a vector
comprising all deal-level controls included in columns (2) to (4) of Table 2: Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold,
Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All
other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in the appendix. t-statistics based on
standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Equity Beta 1.41*** 1.64*** 1.37*** 2.16***
(4.95) (5.24) (4.38) (4.69)
Beta Spread (Equity) -1.06**
(-2.27)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 13,610 13,490 12,211 12,112
57
Table A.3: Non-Parametric Estimation of the Sensitivity of Bidder CAR to Target Asset Beta
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock during
the seven-day window around the bid announcement (Bidder CAR) to the target’s asset beta. The sample period
is 1977 to 2015. Only bids for private targets are included. 1 {a < Target Asset Beta ≤ b} is an indicator equal to
one if the target’s asset beta is larger than a but smaller than (or equal to) b. Deal Controls is a vector comprising
all deal-level controls included in column (5) of Table 2: Beta Spread, Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold,
Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All
other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in the appendix. t-statistics based on
standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
1 {−∞ < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.20} -2.66***
(-2.83)
1 {0.20 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.32} -1.67***
(-2.87)
1 {0.32 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.44} -0.88*
(-1.74)
1 {0.44 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.56} -0.58
(-1.47)
1 {0.56 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.68} -0.30
(-0.88)
1 {0.68 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.80} -0.13
(-0.44)
1 {0.92 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 1.04} 0.55*
(1.68)
1 {1.04 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 1.16} 0.39
(1.00)
1 {1.16 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 1.28} 1.21***
(2.64)
1 {1.28 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 1.40} 1.21***
(2.66)
1 {1.40 < Target Asset Beta <∞} 1.25***
(2.84)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes
Deal Controls Yes
Target Controls Yes
Bidder Controls Yes
Observations 12,109
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Table A.4: Non-Parametric Estimation of the Sensitivity of Bidder CAR to Target Asset Beta:
Private vs. Public Targets
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock during
the seven-day window around the bid announcement (Bidder CAR) to the target’s asset beta. The sample period
is 1977 to 2015. 1 {a < Target Asset Beta ≤ b} is an indicator equal to one if the target’s asset beta is larger than
a but smaller than (or equal to) b. Deal Controls is a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in column
(5) of Table 2: Beta Spread, Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison,
Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed
definitions are provided in the appendix. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-)
industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and
***, respectively.
(1) (2)
Sample: Private Targets Public Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
1 {−∞ < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.25} -2.25*** -1.75*
(-4.19) (-1.88)
1 {0.25 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.48} -1.16*** -1.74***
(-3.27) (-2.69)
1 {0.48 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.71} -0.50* -0.52
(-1.88) (-0.94)
1 {0.94 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 1.17} 0.54* -0.72
(1.91) (-1.32)
1 {1.17 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 1.40} 1.22*** 0.00
(3.53) (0.00)
1 {1.40 < Target Asset Beta <∞} 1.29*** -1.10
(3.04) (-0.89)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes
Target Controls Yes Yes
Bidder Controls Yes Yes
Observations 12,109 3,894
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Table A.5: Alternative Method of Payment Definitions
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the propensity to offer different types of payment to the
bidder’s asset beta (Bidder Asset Beta). The sample period is 1977 to 2015. Equity is an indicator equal to one if
the proposed payment includes stock. Above 50% Stock is an indicator equal to one if the proposed payment consists
of more than 50% stock. Stock vs. Cash is an indicator equal to one if 100% of the proposed payment is in stock and
zero if 100% of the proposed payment is in cash. Deals for which the proposed payment comprises both stock and
cash are excluded from column (3). Deal Controls is a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in column (2)
to (4) of Table 6: Deal Value (Log), Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders,
Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as in Table 6. Detailed definitions are provided
in the appendix. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the bidder’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in
parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: Private and Public Targets
Dependent Variable: Equity Above 50% Stock Stock vs. Cash
Bidder Asset Beta 10.18*** 8.50*** 10.78***
(4.81) (4.73) (5.41)
Target Asset Beta -0.19 -0.95 -0.86
(-0.06) (-0.31) (-0.28)
Target SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,348 17,631 13,237
60
Table A.6: Method of Payment and Target Equity Beta
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the propensity to offer an all-stock payment to the bidder’s
equity beta. The sample period is 1977 to 2015. Bidder (Target) Equity Beta are the bidder’s and target’s equity
beta, respectively. Deal Controls is a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in columns (2) to (4) of Table
6: Deal Value (Log), Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size,
and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as in Table 6. Detailed definitions are provided in the appendix.
t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the bidder’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Private and Public Targets
Dependent Variable: 100% Stock
Bidder Equity Beta 7.61*** 7.62*** 5.54*** 5.52***
(3.86) (3.90) (3.54) (3.47)
Target Equity Beta 0.01
(0.00)
Target SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 21,082 20,471 18,428 18,354
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Table A.7: Descriptive Statistics – Public Firms in Compustat
This table presents descriptive statistics for all public firms in Compustat. The sample period is 1977 to 2015. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentile. Detailed definitions are provided in the appendix.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample: Public Firms in Compustat
Variable: Observations Mean SD Min. p25 p50 p75 Max.
Repurchase 401,784 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 0 1
SEO 401,397 0.52 0.50 0 0 1 1 1
Asset Beta 319,281 0.86 0.35 0.17 0.61 0.86 1.12 1.64
Market Capitalization (in $M) 323,369 1,346 4,726 0 18 88 477 35,739
Market Capitalization (Log) 323,277 4.57 2.44 -12.72 2.91 4.48 6.17 14.41
Market-to-Book 268,111 3.23 5.66 0.19 0.99 1.66 3.04 43.29
Cash to Assets 345,205 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.22 0.96
Debt to Assets 343,987 0.31 0.43 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.41 3.29
ROA 344,168 -0.19 0.88 -6.91 -0.06 0.02 0.06 0.32
Cash Flow to Assets 331,447 -0.15 0.89 -7.02 -0.03 0.05 0.11 0.39
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Table A.8: Share Repurchases, Seasoned Equity Offerings, and Equity Beta
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the propensity to repurchase shares (Repurchase) and to
conduct seasoned equity offerings (SEO) to the firm’s equity beta (Equity Beta). The sample period is 1977 to
2015. All public firms in Compustat are included. All variables are defined as in Table 7. Detailed definitions are
provided in the appendix. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the firm’s (SIC2-) industry are reported
in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Public Firms in Compustat
Dependent Variable: Repurchaset SEOt
Equity Betat−1 -6.60** -9.73*** 15.50*** 11.18***
(-2.29) (-6.08) (5.07) (6.41)
Market Capitalizationt−1 (Log) 4.85*** 4.92***
(21.53) (18.35)
Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.44*** 0.40***
(-7.09) (3.89)
Cash to Assetst−1 -3.10 2.50
(-0.90) (0.92)
Debt to Assetst−1 -9.94*** -4.68
(-5.04) (-1.48)
ROAt−1 2.81 8.51**
(0.82) (2.18)
Cash Flow to Assetst−1 3.90 -12.97***
(1.11) (-2.96)
SIC2 Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 333,001 219,584 332,629 219,260
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Model Variation: Levered Target
Consider a levered target that maintains a constant interest coverage ratio. The bidder’s valuation
of the target’s equity is
Et = (1 + κ× τ)× FCFt+1
rf + βA × µ− g −Dt, (A1)
where κ ≡ Interest Expenset/FCFt ≥ 0 denotes the (inverse of the) interest coverage ratio, τ the
corporate income tax rate, and Dt the level of net debt in the target’s current capital structure.
The market’s valuation of the target’s equity is40
E˜t = (1 + κ× τ)× FCFt+1
rf + µ− g −Dt, (A2)
and the bidder’s cumulative abnormal return around the bid announcement is
CARBiddert = (1 + κ× τ)×
ρ× pi
EBiddert
×
(
FCFt+1
rf + µ− g −
FCFt+1
rf + βA × µ− g
)
. (A3)
Note that (1 + κ× τ) ≥ 1 and ∂κ/∂βA = ∂τ/∂βA = 0. Hence, all predictions derived in Section
2 for the case of an unlevered target remain qualitatively unchanged.
Model Variation: Sloped Empirical SML
Suppose the empirical SML has a slope of γ × µ for some γ ∈ [0, 1] and crosses the CAPM-implied
SML at β = 1. In that case, the target’s cost of capital implied by the empirical SML is
r˜A = rf + (γ × βA + 1− γ)× µ, (A4)
and the market’s assessment of the target’s value is
E˜t =
FCFt+1
rf + (γ × βA + 1− γ)× µ− g . (A5)
40We assume that there is no disagreement between the bidder and the market about the level of net debt (Dt) in
the target’s current capital structure.
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The bidder’s cumulative abnormal return around the bid announcement is
CARBiddert =
ρ× pi
EBiddert
×
[
FCFt+1
rf + (γ × βA + 1− γ)× µ− g −
FCFt+1
rf + βA × µ− g
]
(A6)
=
R× ρ× µ× (1− γ)× (βA − 1)
rf + (γ × βA + 1− γ)× µ− g with R ≡
Bt
EBiddert
=
pi × Et
EBiddert
. (A7)
Hence, for γ ∈ (0, 1), we have41
∂CARBiddert
∂βA
= R× ρ× µ×
[
1
rf + βA × µ− g −
γ × (rf + βA × µ− g)
[rf + (γ × βA + 1− γ)× µ− g]2
]
, (A8)
∂2CARBiddert
∂βA∂R
= ρ× µ×
[
1
rf + βA × µ− g −
γ × (rf + βA × µ− g)
[rf + (γ × βA + 1− γ)× µ− g]2
]
, (A9)
∂2CARBiddert
∂βA∂g
=
ρ× pi × µ× FCFt+1
EBiddert
×
[
2
(rf + βA × µ− g)3
− 2γ
[rf + (γ × βA + 1− γ)× µ− g]3
]
, (A10)
and
∂CARBiddert
∂βA
> 0 ⇐⇒ βA < 1 + rf + µ− g
µ×√γ (A11)
∂2CARBiddert
∂βA∂R
> 0 ⇐⇒ βA < 1 + rf + µ− g
µ×√γ (A12)
∂2CARBiddert
∂βA∂g
> 0 ⇐⇒ βA < 1 + rf + µ− g
µ× γ 13
. (A13)
41For γ = 0, the empirical SML is flat and all results are as in Section 2. For γ = 1, the empirical SML coincides
with the SML implied by the CAPM, and CARBiddert = 0 for all βA.
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Construction of Hypothetical Mutual Fund Fire Sales (HMFFS)
The following description is based on Dessaint, Foucault, Fre´sard, and Matray (2018). For each
stock i, we construct HMFFSi,q,t, a measure of hypothetical sales of stock i in quarter q of year
t due to large outflows in mutual funds owning the stock. Our approach follows the three-step
approach proposed by Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012).
First, in each year t, we estimate quarterly mutual fund flows for all U.S. funds that are not
specialized in a given industry using CRSP mutual funds data. For every fund, CRSP reports the
monthly return and the total net assets (TNA) by asset class. The average return of fund j in
month m of year t is given by
Returnj,m,t =
∑
k(TNAk,j,m,t × Returnk,j,m,t)∑
k TNAk,j,m,t
,
where k indexes asset classes. We compound monthly fund returns to estimate average quarterly
returns and aggregate TNAs across asset classes in March, June, September, and December to
obtain the TNA of fund j at the end of every quarter in each year.
An estimate of the net inflow experienced by fund j in quarter q of year t is then given by
Flowj,q,t =
TNAj,q,t − TNAj,q−1,t × (1 + Returnj,q,t)
TNAj,q−1,t
,
where TNAj,q,t is the total net asset value of fund j at the end of quarter q in year t, and Returnj,q,t
is the return of fund j in quarter q of year t. Flowj,q,t is therefore the net inflow experienced by
fund j in quarter q of year t as a percentage of its net asset value at the beginning of the quarter.
Second, we calculate the dollar value of fund’s j holdings of stock i at the end of every quarter
using data from CDA Spectrum/Thomson. CDA Spectrum/Thomson provides the number of
stocks held by all U.S. funds at the end of every quarter. The total value of the participation held
by fund’s j in firm i at the end of quarter q in year t is
SHARESi,j,q,t × PRCi,q,t,
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where SHARESj,i,q,t is the number of stocks i held by fund j at the end of quarter q in year t, and
PRCi,q,t is the price of stock i at the end of quarter q in year t.
Finally, for all mutual funds for which Flowj,q,t ≤ −0.05, we compute
HMFFSdollarsi,q,t =
∑
j
(Flowj,q,t × SHARESj,i,q−1,t × PRCi,q−1,t).
This variable corresponds to the hypothetical net selling of stock i, in dollars, by all mutual funds
subject to extreme outflows (outflows greater or equal to 5%). We then normalize HMFFSdollarsi,q,t
by the dollar volume of trading in stock i in quarter q of year t (V OLi,q,t) and define
HMFFSi,q,t ≡
∑
j(Flowj,q,t × SHARESj,i,q−1,t × PRCi,q−1,t)
V OLi,q,t
=
HMFFSdollarsi,q,t
V OLi,q,t
.
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